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Abstract
The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum
theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles’
positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid
the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which
Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity
over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration
space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the sta-
tus of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical
options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and disposi-
tionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we
sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches
to quantum mechanics in general.
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1 Introduction
Bohmian mechanics provides for an ontology of non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics in terms of particles and their trajectories in physical space and time.
It is a mathematically precise quantum theory of particles that grounds
the formalism and the predictions of textbook quantum mechanics. The
Bohmian law of motion is expressed by two equations, a guiding equation for
the configuration of particles in three-dimensional space and the Schrödinger
equation, describing the time-evolution of the wave-function, which enters
the guiding equation. The mathematical form of the law is the following
one:


dQ(t)
dt = v
Ψt
(
Q(t)
)
(guiding equation)
i~∂Ψt
∂t
= HΨt (Schrödinger’s equation)
In these equations, Q denotes the spatial configuration of N particles in
three-dimensional space and Ψt the wave-function of that particle configura-
tion at time t. The guiding equation involves the wave-function whose role is
to yield a velocity vector field along which the particles move. The theory is
a first order theory; that is to say, given the wave-function it is sufficient to
specify the positions of all particles at a given time to calculate future and
past motion.
When Bohm reintroduced the theory in 1952 (after de Broglie’s (1928) pre-
sentation of the equations) (Bohm 1952, see also Bohm and Hiley 1993,
Holland 1993), he chose to write the wave-function in polar form for which
the Schrödinger equation splits into two equations. One of them is analo-
gous to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation albeit with an additional term, which
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he called the quantum potential. He then set out to explain various aspects
of the motion of particles in terms of this quantum potential, an explanation
that allowed to appeal to Newtonian intuitions. He called the theory a causal
interpretation of quantum mechanics, as if the “quantum force”, the gradient
of the quantum potential, could be regarded as the cause of certain strange
movements of the particles.
The theory, being a first order theory no matter what, is however not New-
tonian, and the explanatory value of Newtonian concepts like the one of the
quantum potential is dubious. The version of the theory known today as
Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles and their positions; these
are the local beables in Bell’s sense (Bell 1987, ch. 7) or the primitive on-
tology in the sense of Goldstein (1998). Furthermore, it is committed to a
law of motion that describes how the positions of the particles develop in
time. That’s all (see notably Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 1997, Goldstein
and Teufel 2001 and Dürr and Teufel 2009 for a textbook presentation). In
particular, Newtonian concepts like acceleration and forces do not enter the
formulation of the theory, and velocities are not an additional, independent
parameter.
Bohmian mechanics, thus conceived, raises the question of the status of the
law of motion and thereby the one of the status of the wave-function, since
the wave-function figures in the law. This question has not been answered
in a satisfactory manner in the philosophical literature as yet. The aim of
this paper is to investigate the possible answers to this question. To start
with, we recall the open questions that the traditional view of considering
the wave-function as an element of physical reality that guides the motion
of the particles faces (section 2). We then discuss two possible stances for
grounding the law of motion in the primitive ontology of Bohmian mechanics:
the Humean one that regards the law as a contingent regularity (section 3)
and the one that anchors the law in a disposition of motion of the particles
(section 4). We point out the advantages of dispositionalism (section 5). In
conclusion, we briefly explain how the results of this paper apply to primitive
ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general (section 6).
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2 What is the ontological status of the wave-
function?
In order to understand the Bohmian law of motion, it is essential to have
a clear idea about the objects appearing in its mathematical formulation.
Bohmian mechanics starts from the concept of a universal wave-function,
figuring in the fundamental law of motion for all the particles in the universe.
That is, Q(t) describes the configuration of all the particles in the universe
at time t and Ψt is the wave-function at time t, guiding the motion of all
particles taken together. To apply the theory in physical situations of interest
one uses concepts that allow the practical description of subsystems of the
universe. This holds essentially for any fundamental physical theory. In
Bohmian mechanics, the appropriate concept is that of an effective wave-
function, in terms of which the description of a Bohmian subsystem is again
Bohmian, that is, provided by equations of the same form as above. The
status of those equations hence is different depending on whether we consider
the physical description of the universe as a whole or of a subsystem thereof.
Only the law of motion for all the particles in the universe together can be
taken as fundamental, as opposed to effective descriptions of subsystems that
are (fortunately) of the same form, but not on the same footing.
The effective wave-functions are the Bohmian analogue of the usual wave-
functions familiar from the standard formulation of quantum mechanics.
They are the formal objects in the theory that are supposed to be epistem-
ically accessible through local experiments, by preparation or by statistical
analysis of microscopic systems. It is however important to bear in mind that
they are not primitive, but derived from the universal wave-function and the
actual spatial configuration of all the particles ignored in the description of
the respective subsystem. The non-local law of Bohmian mechanics allows
us to encode the influence of those particles, which are not part of the sub-
system but nevertheless have an effect on its evolution, in a single object,
the effective wave-function, which is defined as a function on the subsystem’s
configuration space.
This is done in the following way (see Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì 1992 for
more details): if we split the configuration space of the universe into degrees
of freedom belonging to the subsystem (denoted by x) and the rest of the uni-
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verse, we may regard only the first as a variable and insert into the universal
wave-function the actual configuration Y (t) of all the particles not belonging
to the subsystem. The function Ψt(x, Y (t)) on the configuration space of the
x-system then contains all the degrees of freedom necessary to describe its
dynamics. In many physically relevant situations it turns out that this func-
tion allows the autonomous Bohmian description of the subsystem whence
Ψt(x, Y (t)) becomes the effective wave function ϕt(x) figuring in the guiding
equation for the subsystem and satisfying an autonomous Schrödinger equa-
tion. The description of a Bohmian subsystem then requires the specification
of both, the positions of the particles constituting the system and the effec-
tive wave-function describing their dynamics. The “state” of the subsystem
at time t is thus naturally represented by a pair (qt, ϕt), where qt denotes
the spatial configuration of the particles and ϕt their effective wave-function
at time t. This “quantum state” is no reason for ontological unease, since
it supervenes on the primitive ontology and the fundamental law of motion;
it is nevertheless an objective, physical degree of freedom belonging to the
subsystem (cf. Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph 2012).
How are we to think about those additional degrees of freedom when we
consider a Bohmian subsystem? It is clear that they are not – and cannot
be fancied as – internal degrees of freedom of the particles. Instead, we
can achieve an intuitive physical description by conceiving a field or wave
deploying in the system’s configuration space and determining the possible
trajectories for the motion of the particles according to the guiding law. This
picture of a pilot-wave or guiding field allows us to make sense of experimen-
tal situations such as the interference pattern observed in the double slit
experiment: the particle trajectory goes through either one of the slits, but
the effective wave-function passes through both and is subject to interfer-
ence, which manifests itself in the statistical distribution of the arrival points
of the particles on the screen after many repetitions of the experiment. If we
could not tell this story, the theory would not provide any intuitive physical
understanding of the phenomena.
But to what extent shall we take this picture literally? It might seem
natural to promote the heuristics to a fundamental ontology when instead of
subsystems and effective wave-functions we consider the whole universe and
the fundamental universal wave-function. There is indeed a prima facie good
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reason to do so and to admit the wave-function as a further concrete physical
entity in addition to the particles. Bohmian mechanics is not an action-at-
a-distance theory. Given the wave-function as a function on configuration
space, non-locality is manifested in the fact that the motion of any particle
depends on the spatial configuration of the entire system. But the theory,
as it stands, does not posit a concrete functional form of the wave-function
in terms of the particle positions, and nothing in the formulation of the law
suggests a reading of the dynamics in terms of direct particle interactions.
Even more, the wave-function is described by a dynamical equation in its
own right, an equation that is completely independent of the position or the
motion of the particles.
Thus, there are prima facie good reasons to conclude that the wave-
function is something in addition to the primitive ontology, if the latter is
taken to consist only of particle positions. In admitting the wave-function to
the ontology of Bohmian mechanics, it seems, one has identified a physical
entity that can account for the particular manner in which the particles move.
In other words, acknowledging that Bohmian particles do not per se act on
Bohmian particles, it is tempting to maintain that the wave-function does so:
the particles move the way they do because the wave-function makes them
do so. This seems to be very much the same story as before – the story of
the guiding field –, except that the universal wave-function would have the
task to guide the entire configuration of matter in the universe. It is thus no
longer the kind of wave that can be prepared or propagate through anything.
But first and foremost, the story is now supposed to be the one that nature
tells, not just one that physicists tell about experiments. It will thus have to
stand up to further scrutiny.
If the wave-function is admitted as part of the ontology, the metaphor of a
guiding field may suggest that it has to be understood just like the word says:
as a physical field. It is however clear that it cannot be a field (or wave) of the
usual kind, existing in three-dimensional physical space. Instead, it would
have to be conceived as a field on the high-dimensional configuration space
of the universe, implying thus that configuration space is not only a mathe-
matical representation of configurations of N particles in three-dimensional
physical space, but has to be granted a physical reality in its own right as a
3N -dimensional space (see e.g. Bell 1987, p. 128). The ontology then consists
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of N particles in physical space and the wave-function on configuration space,
presumably acting on the one point in configuration space that corresponds,
mathematically, to the actual configuration of matter in physical space. But
such an ontology is problematic. The mathematical correspondence between
points in configuration space and configurations in physical space is obvious.
However, if one admits configuration space as a further stage of physical re-
ality – in addition to and independent of three-dimensional physical space –,
it is unclear how there could be a real connection between these two spaces
that could amount to something existing in the one space guiding or piloting
the motion of entities existing in the other one.
This problem is well-known in the literature (see e.g. Monton 2006 for
a clear formulation) and acknowledged even by adherents of Bohm’s theory
(see e.g. Callender and Weingard 1997, p. 35). There are several propos-
als that seek to avoid this problem while nevertheless retaining the ontology
of a guiding field. One possibility consists in deleting the commitment to
configuration space as being part and parcel of the physical ontology and
in placing the wave-function in physical space, although it cannot be an or-
dinary field or wave. Forrest (1988, ch. 6.2) contemplates the idea of the
wave-function representing a “polywave” in three-dimensional physical space,
assigning properties to sets or tuples of N points instead of individual points.
Norsen (2010) abandons the commitment to a single wave-function guiding
the motion of the particles and associates with each particle an infinite num-
ber of fields in three-dimensional space, thus seeking to achieve an ontology
that is committed only to local beables. The other, more radical possibility
is to take the opposite direction of Forrest and Norsen and to claim that the
extremely high-dimensional space known as configuration space is itself the
fundamental stage of physical reality, instead of three-dimensional space or
four-dimensional space-time. This idea is implemented in Albert’s marvel-
lous point formulation of Bohmian mechanics (Albert 1996). In this case,
this space is strictly speaking no longer a configuration space, since there is
no given configuration of anything to which it is related. In general, however,
it is fair to say that none of these attempts has been able to gain widespread
acceptance so far (see in particular Monton 2002 and 2006 for a detailed
criticism of Albert’s proposal).
There is a common argument why the concept of a field (in all its vari-
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ations) is inappropriate when discussing the nature of the wave-function in
Bohmian mechanics. In quantum mechanics, the quantum state of a (closed)
system is usually understood projectively. This is to say that it is represented
by a ray in a Hilbert-space rather than by a single vector. In Bohmian me-
chanics (where the position representation is distinguished), this projective
nature is manifested in the fact that for any complex number c, Ψ and cΨ
give rise to the same equation of motion for the particles (even if we insist
on Ψ being normalized, we have the gauge-freedom of multiplying it by any
c-number of modulus one). Hence, it can be argued that the particular value
that Ψ assigns to individual points in configuration space is meaningless and
that the wave-function is therefore not the kind of physical object that we
can call a “field”.
Of course, we should be open-minded enough to concede that the ontology
of a physical theory may contain other kinds of objects than just particles
and fields. Insisting on an ontological interpretation of the wave-function,
the fall-back position may thus be to say that the wave-function is an ele-
ment of physical reality, although it does not come under any of the familiar
categories. But why insist on the ontological interpretation in the first place?
In fact, as far as the idea of the wave-function as a concrete physical entity is
motivated by the desire to have something in the ontology that can serve as
the cause for the motion of the particles, the whole endeavour seems doubtful.
Bohmian mechanics does not tell us that particles without a guiding-field are
at rest, while particles “acted upon” by a wave-function are moving – or any-
thing of that kind. It rather tells us that certain wave-functions correspond
to particles not moving at all, whereas other (generic) wave-functions corre-
spond to particles moving in a particular way, as described by the guiding
equation.
In sum, there are well-founded reservations against taking the wave-
function to be part of the ontology of Bohmian mechanics (see also Callender
unpublished, section 5). The relationship between the wave-function and the
motion of the particles is more appropriately conceived as a nomic one, in-
stead of a causal one in terms of one physical entity acting on the other.
This leads us to the nomological interpretation of the wave-function, as sug-
gested by Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì (1997), Goldstein and Teufel (2001)
and Goldstein and Zanghì (2013).
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If one abandons the commitment to the wave-function as a physical entity,
the ontology consists only in the particles and their positions, each particle
having exactly one, determinate spatio-temporal trajectory. Thus, for in-
stance, in the double slit experiment with one particle at a time, the particle
goes through exactly one of the two slits, and that is all there is in the phys-
ical world. There is no field or wave that guides the motion of the particle,
propagates through both slits and undergoes interference. A non-local law
of motion that says that the development of the position of any particle (its
velocity and thus its trajectory) depends on the positions of all the other par-
ticles, including the particles composing the experimental set-up, accounts
for the observed particle positions on the screen. It is precisely for such in-
stances that the non-local influence of the other particles can be encoded in
the effective wave-function, but there is no need to commit oneself to the
associated intuition of a guiding field as the correct description of physical
reality.
A law of motion tells us what happens, or can happen or would happen
in four-dimensional space-time (given the specification of initial conditions),
but it is not itself an entity existing in space and time. By the same token,
the wave-function, insofar as it figures in the law of motion, is a mathematical
object defined on configuration space, instead of a physical object existing in
addition to the particles. This is to say nothing more than that the formula-
tion of a law of motion for the primitive ontology may contain mathematical
objects that do not themselves correspond to physical objects.
The nomological interpretation of the wave-function should obviously not
result in replacing the problematic claim that “the wave-function moves the
particles” with the even more problematic one that “the law moves the par-
ticles”. However, by studying the role of Ψ as it figures in the law, one can
learn something informative about the meaning of this thing called “wave-
function”. The answer one arrives at will however depend on what exactly
one takes a physical law to be. There are two main views about laws of
nature discussed in the philosophical literature. Both of them can be drawn
upon for developing the nomological interpretation of the wave-function in
Bohmian mechanics. The first possibility is to recognize only particles’ po-
sitions in the ontology, conceived as categorical properties, and to take the
law to supervene on contingent facts about the distribution of the particles
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in space and time. On this view, the law has a merely descriptive function,
but there nevertheless is an objective law of motion formulated in terms of a
universal wave-function. The other possibility is to admit more in the ontol-
ogy than just particles’ positions and to take the law, including the universal
wave-function, to be grounded in what there thus is added to the ontology.
In other words, the law is grounded in the nature or essence of the proper-
ties that the entities in space and time instantiate. These properties then
are conceived as dispositions (in the sense of what one may call “law-making
properties”, that is, properties for which it is essential to exercize a certain
nomological role).
Bohmian mechanics is also compatible with a primitivism about laws as
advocated by Maudlin (2007). This view admits the law itself as part of the
fundamental ontology. Applied to Bohmian mechanics, this view can limit
itself to maintaining that there is nothing more to understand the meaning
of the wave-function than to grasp its role in the formulation of the equation
of motion for the primitive ontology. Note that according to this view, there
is no sharp distinction between a nomological and an ontological interpreta-
tion of the wave-function, since laws belong to the stock of physical reality
as well. In brief, if one is prepared to accept laws as primitives, there is
not much reason to worry about the status of the wave-function in Bohmian
mechanics in particular. However, if one does worry about the status of the
wave-function, and if one considers Humeanism about laws to be unsatisfac-
tory, then dispositionalism is to our mind the more attractive anti-Humean
position (cf. also the review of Maudlin 2007 by Suárez 2009, p. 276): dis-
positionalism offers an account of what the wave-function stands for, instead
of merely describing its role in a law that is accepted as primitive. In the
following, we set out to show that the ontology of Bohmian mechanics can
be clearly stated and understood in terms of a standard metaphysical theory
of properties that does not accept laws as primitive, be it a Humean theory,
be it a dispositionalist one.
3 Humeanism about laws
Insisting on the fact that laws cannot move the entities in space and time,
one may draw the conclusion that nothing does so. The view known as
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Humeanism about laws of nature implements this conclusion, going back to
David Hume’s denial of necessary connections in nature (e.g. Hume 1748,
section VII). According to this view, laws only have a descriptive function.
The ontology consists in the distribution of particulars (such as particles and
their positions) throughout the whole of space-time. Thus, David Lewis, the
most prominent contemporary advocate of this position, advances the thesis
of Humean supervenience, characterizing it in the following manner:
It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic
of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then an-
other. (...) We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatio-
temporal distance between points. ... And at those points we have lo-
cal qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing
bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have
an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. ... All else supervenes on
that. (Lewis 1986a, pp. ix-x)
On this view, the distribution of the fundamental physical properties over
the whole of space-time is entirely contingent: for each single token of a
fundamental physical property at a space-time point (such as a particle being
located at that point), it is conceivable and metaphysically possible to hold
that token fixed and to vary all the other tokens. In particular, given a
possible world that is a duplicate of the current state of the actual world,
the development of the distribution of the fundamental physical properties
in that possible world may be entirely different from the development of the
distribution of the fundamental physical properties in the actual world. In
short, the physical properties instantiated at any given space-time point or
region do not impose any restrictions at all on the physical properties that
can be instantiated at other space-time points or regions (see Beebee 2006).
It is a contingent matter of fact that the distribution of the fundamental
physical properties throughout space-time in the actual universe manifests
certain regularities. Given that entire distribution, the laws of nature then
are, according to Lewis, the axioms of the description of that distribution that
achieves the best balance between logical simplicity and empirical content
(e.g. Lewis 1973, pp. 72-75).
Humeanism about laws is applicable to Bohmian mechanics. Assume that
one knows the positions of all the particles in the universe throughout the
11
whole history of the universe. The wave-function of the universe then is that
description of the universe that achieves, at the end of the universe, the best
balance between logical simplicity and empirical content. In other words, the
wave-function of the universe supervenes on the distribution of the particles’
positions throughout the whole of space-time; the same goes for the law of
motion. This supervenience relationship includes that the wave-function of
the universe applies not only to the actual distribution of particle positions
throughout space-time, but also to other possible distributions. Given that
we are ignorant about the exact positions of the particles in the universe,
we then get, through the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, to effective wave-
functions and quantum statistics as the best description we can achieve for
subsystems of the universe (cf. Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 1992). But
note that on this view, only the universal wave-function that supervenes on
the particles’ positions throughout the whole history of the universe has a
nomological status. No effective wave-function describing subsystems can
claim such a status.
Since Humeanism is applicable to Bohmian mechanics, one cannot sim-
ply jump to the conclusion that the mere fact of quantum entanglement
refutes an atomistic worldview such as Lewis’ thesis of Humean superve-
nience (e.g. Teller 1986) or that such a thesis applies only to configuration
space by contrast to four-dimensional, physical space-time (Loewer 1996, p.
104). Quantum entanglement is a feature of the formalism of quantum me-
chanics. The question is what the appropriate ontology for this formalism is.
If one elaborates on an ontology of quantum mechanics in terms of particle
positions, as does Bohmian mechanics, and if one adopts the metaphysical
stance of Humeanism, then one can maintain that (a) the entanglement is
a feature only of the wave-function and that (b) the wave-function of the
universe supervenes on the distribution of the particle positions throughout
the whole of four-dimensional, physical space-time. Consider the following
quotation from Bell’s paper on “The theory of local beables” (1975):
One of the apparent non-localities of quantum mechanics is the
instantaneous, over all space, ‘collapse of the wave function’ on mea-
surement’. But this does not bother us if we do not grant beable
status to the wave function. We can regard it simply as a convenient
but inessential mathematical device for formulating correlations be-
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tween experimental procedures and experimental results, i.e., between
one set of beables and another. Then its odd behaviour is acceptable
as the funny behaviour of the scalar potential of Maxwell’s theory in
Coulomb gauge. (quoted from Bell 1987, p. 53)
Bell’s remark applies to quantum theories in terms of local beables in general:
once one has specified what the local beables are (e.g. particle positions,
or what is today known as flashes in Bell’s ontology for GRW – see Bell
1987, ch. 22), one is free to say that the local beables are all there is and
that the quantum formalism is a mere means to formulate regularities in
the distribution of the local beables in space-time. This is a coherent view
(although not necessarily Bell’s considered view: when writing about Bohm’s
theory, he usually urges a commitment to the wave-function as part of the
ontology – see e.g. Bell 1987, p. 128).
If one takes this view, one is committed only to “a vast mosaic of local
matters of particular fact” as Lewis puts it in the quotation above, consisting
in the case of Bohmian mechanics in particle positions. The mosaic of the
particle positions in the actual world happens to be such that on it supervenes
an entangled wave-function figuring in a non-local law of motion. But there
is no real physical relation of entanglement that exists as a non-supervenient
relation in four-dimensional space-time in addition to the relations of spatio-
temporal distance among the particle positions. By the same token, there
is not any sort of a holistic physical property instantiated in space and time
over and above the local particle positions.
There are a number of substantial philosophical objections against Humean-
ism, which are, however, not relevant to the purpose of this paper (see e.g.
Mumford 2004, part I). There is a common objection from physics, which
may be taken to be pertinent in our context: on Humeanism, the laws of
fundamental physics do not have any explanatory function. They sum up, at
the end of the universe, what has happened in the universe; but they do not
answer the question why what has happened did in fact happen, given cer-
tain initial conditions. In other words, as regards the domain of fundamental
physics, Humeanism accepts all there is in that domain as a primitive fact.
The reason is the above mentioned possibility of unrestricted combinations:
for each single token of a fundamental physical property at a space-time point
(such as a particle located at that point), it is conceivable and metaphysi-
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cally possible to hold that token fixed and to vary all the other tokens. By
way of consequence, there are no real connections among the property tokens
occurring at space-time points, which could be revealed by a law and which
could explain the temporal evolution of the distribution of the fundamental
physical property tokens.
However, one can with reason maintain that science in general – and
fundamental physics in particular – searches for real connections in nature
and that the stress that science lays on discovering laws derives from the
idea that laws reveal the real connections that there are in nature instead
of being mere devices of economical bookkeeping. Let us therefore enquire
into another option to ground the laws of nature in the physical properties,
namely dispositionalism and its applicability to Bohmian mechanics.
4 Laws grounded in dispositions
The main anti-Humean position about laws of nature in contemporary phi-
losophy traces laws back to properties. According to this view, it is essential
for a property to induce a certain behaviour of the objects that instantiate
the property in question; the law then expresses that behaviour. A stock
example is gravitational mass in Newtonian mechanics: in virtue of being
massive, particles attract (accelerate) each other in the manner described
by the Newtonian law of gravity. Obviously, the ambition of this account
is not to tell us something new about the physics of Newtonian gravity, but
to ground the law in the ontology, that is, to clarify how theoretical terms
(expressed in the language of mathematics) connect to the entities existing
in the physical world. The parameter we call “mass” refers to a property of
the particles. This property is not a pure quality (for then the question how
this property connects to a law would remain unanswered), but a disposition
whose manifestation is the mutual attraction of the particles as expressed
qualitatively and quantitatively by the law.
In general, this view amounts to considering properties as dispositions to
bring about certain effects; the laws supervene on the dispositions in the sense
that they express what objects can do in virtue of having certain properties
(e.g. Dorato 2005, Bird 2007). Consequently, laws are suitable to figure in
explanations answering why-questions. On this view, as on Humeanism, laws
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do not belong to the ontology. However, in contrast to Humeanism, they are
anchored in the essence of the properties of the objects that there are in the
physical world, instead of being mere means of economical description.
When applying this view to Bohmian mechanics, one has to be aware of
the fact that it has nothing to do with the claim that all properties apart from
position are contextual in Bohm’s theory; that claim is sometimes formulated
in terms of all the other properties being dispositions that are actualized in
certain measurement contexts. As regards the philosophical literature on
properties as dispositions, it is misleading to talk in terms of dispositions in
this respect, because dispositions are real and actual properties that exist
in the world independently of any measurements. The so-called contextual
properties, by contrast, simply are ways in which the particles move in cer-
tain contexts such as certain experimental set-ups and statistical descriptions
that apply to those contexts (and that can be expressed by self-adjoint op-
erators as bookkeeping devices). But these “contextual properties” are not
fundamental. Strictly speaking, they are not properties of anything at all,
and there is nothing of philosophical interest in them (as there is nothing of
philosophical interest in self-adjoint operators). The point at issue is whether
the fundamental physical properties in Bohmian mechanics are dispositions
and whether it is in this manner that they ground the law of motion.
In a recent paper, Belot (2012) discusses the option of tracing the Bohmian
law of motion back to dispositions. Over and above the position of each par-
ticle, Belot countenances a disposition that determines the velocity of the
particles as an additional, holistic property of the system of particles under
consideration. He characterizes this view in the following manner:
That is, let us explore an interpretation of Bohmian mechanics un-
der which the complete history of a quantum system is specified by
specifying for each time t a configuration q(t) of the particles together
with the dispositional property Φt that tells us, for each possible con-
figuration of the system of particles at t, what the velocity of each
particle would be were that configuration actual. On this interpreta-
tion, all we have are particles and properties of (systems of) particles
– at each time, each particle has a mass and a position and the sys-
tem of particles as a whole has a further dispositional property. Let
us call this approach the dispositionalist interpretation of Bohmian
mechanics. (p. 78)
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On this view, the universal wave-function Ψt of the system of particles at a
given time is a mathematical object that represents the disposition to move
in a certain manner at that time. This disposition is a holistic property of
all the particles in the universe together – that is, a relational property that
takes all the particles as relata. It induces a certain temporal development of
the particle configuration, that development being its manifestation. In other
words, given a spatial configuration of the particles (actual or counterfactual)
and the disposition of motion at a time as represented by the wave-function
as input, the Bohmian law of motion yields the velocities of the particles at
that time as output.
Again, what needs to be emphasized and may have remained unclear in
Belot’s exposition, is that only the universal wave-function has a nomological
status. It would be a misunderstanding to apply nomological interpretations
to wave-functions of any odd physical system and to seek to ground such
wave-functions in dispositions. The effective wave-function of a subsystem
defines an equation of motion for the particles constituting that subsystem,
but it cannot be seen as expressing the disposition of motion of those par-
ticles, since only the disposition of motion of the totality of particles in the
universe can serve as the ontological basis for the law of motion. Given
that the disposition of motion is a property of all the particles in the uni-
verse together, it cannot be but a disposition that produces its manifestation
spontaneously, that is, a certain form of motion of the particles; this dis-
position cannot require an external stimulus, since there is nothing external
to the totality of all the particles in the universe. There is no metaphysical
reason to hold that dispositions necessarily depend on external triggering
conditions for their manifestation. If the fundamental physical properties
are regarded as dispositions, it is reasonable to assume that they manifest
themselves spontaneously. Coming back to the mentioned stock example of
a fundamental physical disposition, in Newtonian gravity, particles sponta-
neously attract each other in virtue of their mass.
Belot (2012) formulates an objection to the dispositionalist interpretation
of Bohmian mechanics, suggesting that dispositions alone may not tell the
entire story about the physical matter of facts. Concretely, he considers a
single Bohmian particle in a one-dimensional box and points out that there
are countably many real-valued wave-functions corresponding to different
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energy eigenstates, but representing the same disposition of motion, as they
all describe a particle that is at rest at all times. He concludes:
Observations of this sort may seem to all but scupper the dispo-
sitionalist interpretation: for it may well appear that in taking dis-
positional histories rather than histories of the quantum state to be
fundamental, the dispositionalist interpretation discards a great deal
of the essential physical content of quantum mechanics. (p. 80)
Such worries do not apply to the account presented here. We have already
emphasized that only the common disposition of motion of all the particles
in the universe together is fundamental. But if the “dispositional histories”
involve the spatial configuration and the disposition of motion for all there is
in the universe, there is no physical content left that would be unaccounted
for. Note that energy is not a primitive quantity in Bohmian mechanics. The
universal wave-function can be an eigenstate of the universal Hamiltonian
(and will be, in fact, if it is stationary), but the corresponding eigenvalue
has no physical meaning. Energy plays a physical role in the description of
subsystems. Hence, we should indeed worry about the energy of the system
“particle in a box” if we could stick our hand in it. If, however, that single
particle was all there is in the entire universe, expressing its law of motion
in terms of different real-valued wave-functions, corresponding to different
eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian, would not describe different physical facts.
Still, the observation that even the entire history of dispositions of mo-
tion does not necessarily determine a unique (universal) wave-function is
obviously correct. Many different wave-functions may give rise to the same
law of motion. One may find this fact unsatisfactory. However, we have
left the idea of treating the wave-function as an additional physical object
behind in section 2. If one regards the wave-function as a formal object ap-
pearing in the mathematical formulation of the law, there is no need to insist
on the relationship between the fundamental disposition of motion and its
representation in terms of a universal wave-function on configuration space
being one-to-one. Let us bear in mind that mathematical representations
need to be unambiguous only as far as the elements of physical reality and
the fundamental laws are concerned. It is a further advantage of primitive
ontology theories that they enable us to make such distinctions in a clear-cut
way.
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In a manuscript available on his website, Thomson-Jones (2012) also sug-
gests a dispositionalist reading of the wave-function in Bohmian mechan-
ics. By contrast to Belot (2012) and to our view, Thomson-Jones attributes
to each particle a multitude of dispositions for various motions in three-
dimensional space whose manifestation depends on the positions of all the
other particles (the dispositions of the other particles are the triggering con-
ditions for the dispositions of the particle in question). However, let us recall
that the wave-function enters Bohmian mechanics through the role it plays
in the law of motion (the guiding equation) by fixing the velocity of the parti-
cles and that only the universal wave-function has a nomological status. The
rationale for introducing dispositions in the ontology of Bohmian mechanics
is to ground the law of motion in the ontology while being committed only
to entities that exist in physical space and time. Consequently, since there is
only one universal wave-function, and since the universal wave-function is in
any case non-separable, there is no reason to commit oneself to anything more
than sparse dispositions: there is exactly one disposition that fixes the form
of motion of all the particles by fixing their velocities, thus fixing the tem-
poral development of the configuration of particles. That single disposition
is sufficient to account for the motion of any particle (or any sub-collection
of particles) in all possible circumstances.
There is another common objection to the nomological interpretation in
general and its dispositionalist variant in particular, which derives from the
following observation: if the fundamental wave-function of the universe is
conceived merely as a formal object figuring in the law of motion for the
particles, it may seem strange that it follows a dynamical equation itself
and hence gives rise to a law of motion which is time-dependent (or rather,
“time-indexed”). In reply to this objection, let us note in the first place
that dispositionalism can in principle accommodate the idea of laws being
time-dependent. Laws can be grounded in the dispositions that the objects
in the universe instantiate at a given time. Thus, if the disposition for a
certain form of motion of the configuration of particles in the universe is
time-dependent, so is the universal wave-function that is grounded in that
disposition and, consequently, the law of motion. This would mean that
time is not only parameterizing the motion of the particles, but that the
particles are somehow sensitive to the precise value of that parameter, as
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if they carried a little clock with them. In other words, the particles have
not just the disposition to move in a certain way, given a certain spatial
configuration, but that disposition also depends on what time it is in the
universe. We would find this somewhat strange, but we see no a priori reason
why the universe could not be like that.
Nonetheless, dispositionalism about laws, as applied to Bohmian mechan-
ics, is by no means committed to this view. It is reasonable to suppose that
if there were two identical spatial configurations of the universe but at dif-
ferent times, these configurations would behave in exactly the same way. In
brief: same spatial configuration of all the particles in the universe, same
disposition of motion. Taking this view then commits us to the supposition
that the universal wave-function that enters the Bohmian guiding equation is
time-independent – a supposition that is in fact less bold than often alleged.
Note that, pace Belot (2012, pp. 74-77), one is not automatically com-
mitted to enter into the even more controversial issue of a quantum theory
of gravity if one envisages a time-independent Bohmian law of motion: one
can conceive a quantum theory with a universal wave-function that is a sta-
tionary solution of the Schrödinger equation without that quantum theory
having to include gravitational degrees of freedom. In Bohmian mechanics,
a wave-function can define a non-trivial dynamics for the motion of parti-
cles without itself evolving in time. Bohmian mechanics is not hit by the
notorious problem of time that plagues the usual approaches to a universal
wave-function (especially in quantum gravity). In other words, the common
dilemma of either having to countenance a time-dependent wave-function or
facing the problem of time does not apply to Bohmian mechanics. The reason
is that the wave-function does not provide the ontology of the theory. The
ontology, the stuff that moves in space and time (or the geometry of space-
time itself), is external to the wave-function. The latter only enters into the
equation of motion for the entities posed in the primitive ontology. Hence, if
one replaces the time-dependent wave-function in the guiding equation with
a time-independent one, that equation still yields as output the velocities
of the particles in the universe at time t. It is only that in this case, it is
irrelevant what time it is in order to determine the velocities of the particles,
given their positions.
Furthermore, let us bear in mind that it is very well possible for effective
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wave-functions to have a non-trivial (Schrödinger-type) evolution in time,
even if the fundamental wave-function of the universe from which they are
derived is stationary. The time-dependence of the effective wave-functions
then comes only from the evolution of the spatial configuration Y (t) of the
particles that are not part of the described subsystem (see Goldstein and
Teufel 2001 for details). In brief, the universal wave-function entering the
guiding equation may very well be a stationary solution of the universal
Schrödinger equation and still account for the usual quantum behaviour of
subsystems as described by effective wave-functions and their Schrödinger
equations. The Schrödinger equation for the universal wave-function is then
to be regarded not as a dynamical equation, but (similar to the Wheeler-
deWitt equation) as a constraint on the universal wave-function, stipulating
its time-independence.
5 Advantages of dispositionalism
In section 2, we have pointed out problematic aspects of admitting the wave-
function as part of the ontology. These aspects can be divided into the
following two ones: the status of configuration space and the ability of the
wave-function to guide the motion of particles in physical space. Let us now
consider how dispositionalism can improve on these issues.
The spatial configuration of a universe of N particles at time t is repre-
sented by a vector Q(t) ∈ R3N . This vector can be regarded as a point in
configuration space, but represents the actual configuration of the particles
in three-dimensional physical space. The 3N-dimensional configuration space
is usually understood as the mathematical representation of all possible con-
figurations of N particles existing in three-dimensional physical space. Re-
garding the universal wave-function as a complex-valued function Ψ(x), the
variable x then ranges over all possible spatial configurations of the universe.
A tension now arises when this function is supposed to represent a physical
field, existing as a concrete entity in the actual physical world. Then, one
either has to argue that the space of possible configurations somehow super-
venes on the actual configuration of the particles in physical space, or grant
it an independent reality in addition to three-dimensional physical space.
The dispositionalist, by contrast, has no such troubles. In being located
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in a certain manner in three-dimensional physical space, the particles have
the disposition to move in a certain way. The universal wave-function, as a
function on configuration space, represents that disposition, concerning, no-
tably, all possible configurations of the particles, actual and counterfactual.
At time t, the disposition of motion is instantiated only by the actual config-
uration of the universe at that time, corresponding, formally, to evaluating
the function Ψt (or rather the guiding equation) at Q(t). Nonetheless, qua
being a disposition and thus a modal property, it grounds the truth value for
counterfactual propositions stating how the particles would move if another
configuration were the actual one. In brief, on dispositionalism, the truth
value of all counterfactual propositions is grounded in what actually exists
in the physical world, namely the disposition of motion of the particles.
Concerning the second issue, the commitment to dispositions obviously
fulfils the task of providing in the ontology for something that is able to
account for the motion of the particles. From a philosophical point of view,
nothing speaks against considering the disposition for a certain form of mo-
tion as a causal property, although it is not a force or a potential, simply
because its essence is to do something, namely to fix a certain velocity with
which the particles move. Consequently, the law of motion grounded in this
disposition can be regarded as a causal law, giving rise to causal explana-
tions, whereby the efficient cause for the motion of the particles is situated
in the particles themselves.
In short, there is a disposition for a certain form of motion as a property of
the particles instead of a field or a pilot-wave external to the particles that is
supposed to move them. Nonetheless, it may seem that the dualism of entities
has simply been replaced with a dualism of properties. On the one hand, one
may argue, there is position as an intrinsic and categorical property of each
of the particles, and on the other hand, there is a disposition of motion as a
relational and dispositional property of the particles. One may also consider
the velocity of the particles as a further property.
In reply to this query, let us note the following three points: (1) There is
no problem of connection of the various properties admitted in the ontology,
if all elements of the ontology are located in physical space and, moreover,
if all properties are properties of the particles. In other words, even if there
is a dualism of properties, it does not give rise to the objections that hit the
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dualistic ontology of particles in physical space and a field on configuration
space. (2) Insofar as there is a dualism of a disposition for a certain form of
motion and the velocity of the particles as its manifestation, it is not trou-
blesome. It rather is an analytic dualism: if one recognizes dispositions, one
also has to admit properties that are the manifestations of the dispositions
in question (otherwise there would be no dispositions). (3) As regards the
relationship between the position of the particles and their disposition for a
certain form of motion, one can maintain that position also is a relational
property, consisting in a relation of spatial or spatio-temporal distance among
the particles (if one does not presuppose the existence of an absolute space
or at least does not conceive the location of a particle at a point in absolute
space as an intrinsic property of the particle).
Going one step further, the dispositionalist does not even have to concede
that position, conceived as spatial or spatio-temporal relations among the
particles, is a categorical property by contrast to a dispositional one (so that
in the end, there is no dualism of dispositional and categorical properties).
For instance, in general relativity theory, one can regard the spatio-temporal,
metrical relations as including the disposition to move the particles (since the
metrical relations yield the manifestation of gravitation). The Bohmian law
of motion, grounded in dispositions, may justify a similar claim: in virtue
of standing in certain spatial or spatio-temporal relations, the particles have
the disposition to move in a certain manner. It may therefore well turn
out that in the end, there is only one type of physical properties, namely
relations that are dispositions or that bestow dispositions to move on the
system of particles. In any case, one can say that in standing in spatial
relations (being localized), the particles have the disposition to move in a
certain manner (change in their spatial relations), making thus clear that
there is no separation between these two properties.
Let us finally compare dispositionalism with Humeanism. Whereas the
Humean admits only particle positions conceived as categorical properties as
ontologically primitive, the dispositionalist regards the particle positions as
including a disposition for a certain form of motion. Due to this disposition,
there are real connections in nature in a twofold sense: first of all, since the
disposition of motion is a holistic property of all the particles taken together,
it establishes a real connection among the particles – a real, irreducible re-
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lation over and above the external, geometrical relations of spatial distance.
Furthermore, since this disposition induces a certain form of motion of the
particles, it establishes a real connection (a causal connection having the
ontological status of a real connection) between the configuration of the par-
ticles in the universe at a given time and that configuration at future times.
Basing oneself on this disposition, one can therefore explain the temporal
development of the configuration of the particles in the universe, given an
initial state (that is, an initial configuration of particle positions).
One may grant that dispositionalism, by contrast to Humeanism, is able
to explain the development of the universe by admitting real connections.
However, one may object that dispositionalism does not fare better than
Humeanism when it comes to explaining the most striking feature of quantum
mechanics, namely the non-locality that is, for instance, revealed in the EPR-
Bohm experiment (but also already implicit in the double slit experiment).
Dispositionalism accepts a disposition of motion as a holistic property of the
totality of the particles in the universe as primitive. It can thus not explain
why this disposition is a holistic property rather than a property that belongs
to each particle considered individually.
However, one can retort that calling for such an explanation expresses a
wrong-headed presupposition rather than a sound demand. Quantum non-
locality can with reason be taken to be a fundamental feature of nature.
Calling for an explanation of it is possible only against the background of
assuming that the natural state of affairs is one of locality. Whereas the
experience of our macroscopic environment may suggest such a view, it is by
no means self-evident; Bohmian mechanics can explain why the non-locality
of quantum mechanics is not manifest in everyday experience. But a priori,
there is no reason why the temporal development of what there is in the
universe should be determined by local rather than by holistic properties.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, let us put the argument of this paper into the wider framework
of approaches that consider the formalism of quantum mechanics as repre-
senting or referring to a physical reality that is external to this formalism and
that cannot be derived from it (by contrast to approaches that accept the
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quantum formalism, that is the wave function and / or the observables, as
irreducible and seek to establish solely on this basis a link with experience).
Theories in this vein describe the quantum world in terms of what is known
as a primitive ontology – “primitive” because the ontology cannot be read
off from the formalism but has to be posed as that to what the formalism
refers. In other words, none of the objects appearing in the formulation of
textbook quantum mechanics can be straightforwardly taken to represent
stuff existing in time and space, but we can achieve an understanding of
those objects by inquiring into their relation to the primitive ontology, once
the latter has been established as that what the formalism is actually about.
Bohmian mechanics is the most elaborate approach in this sense: particles in
three-dimensional space make up the primitive ontology, and a guiding equa-
tion is provided that describes their motion and into which the quantum
mechanical wave-function enters. Other proposals for a primitive ontology
include density of stuff in three-dimensional space as in the GRW mass den-
sity interpretation (Ghirardi et al. 1995) and flashes occurring at points in
four-dimensional space-time as in the GRW flash interpretation (Bell 1987,
p. 205, Tumulka 2006) (see Allori et al. 2008 for an illuminating comparison
between these approaches). Primitive ontology approaches face the difficulty
that what is posed as the primitive ontology in three-dimensional space does
in itself not contain anything that accounts for the temporal development
of the elements of that ontology (particle positions in Bohmian mechanics).
This shortcoming then motivates an ontological dualism, admitting both the
elements of the primitive ontology in three-dimensional space and the wave-
function in configuration space as constituting physical reality. However, as
pointed out in section 2, it is doubtful whether the wave-function in config-
uration space is suitable to fill this lacuna. Following the spirit of the idea
to regard the formalism of quantum mechanics as a means of representation
that refers to a physical reality external to it, one gets to the view of the
wave-function being nomological rather than being an element of physical
reality – or, more generally speaking, to the idea of the formalism of quan-
tum mechanics providing for a law, such as the Bohmian law of motion (or
the GRW law if the standard formalism is modified to a non-linear equation
for the wave-function). It would then obviously be misguided to call for a
one-to-one correspondence between the mathematical objects entering the
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formulation of the law and the elements of physical reality. The purpose of
this paper has been to further develop that nomological stance. There are
two main options open if one sets out to do so. One option is to abandon the
call for something in the ontology that accounts for the temporal develop-
ment of the entities that are posed in the primitive ontology. A central result
of this paper is that this can be done in a clear and consistent manner. The
mere fact of the existence of primitive ontology approaches to quantum me-
chanics and their empirical adequacy refutes the widespread impression that
quantum mechanics contradicts Humeanism – more precisely, Lewis’ thesis of
Humean supervenience: the world according to quantum mechanics can be “a
vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact”, namely the spatio-temporal
distribution of the elements posed in the primitive ontology such as particle
positions. The universal wave-function and the laws of quantum mechanics
supervene on this distribution. They are nothing more than devices of eco-
nomical bookkeeping, there being no real connections among the elements of
the primitive ontology (such as a real relation of entanglement); there is only
a non-dynamical background structure of space-time geometry into which
these elements are inserted. The other option is to conceive the elements of
the primitive ontology as including a disposition to develop in a certain man-
ner in time. That disposition then grounds the law of motion in the sense
that the law expresses or reveals that disposition. Given the fact of quantum
non-locality, that disposition has to be conceived as a holistic property of the
elements of the primitive ontology – in non-relativistic Bohmian mechanics,
a property of all the particles at a given time taken together (in a relativistic
setting, “given time” will have to be appropriately understood, for example
by specifying a space-like hypersurface). One important message of our anal-
ysis is that the nomological interpretation can be consistently applied only to
the fundamental wave-function referring to all local beables in the universe
together. This fundamental universal level has to be distinguished from the
effective description of subsystems, which is, in the end, what the usual quan-
tum formalism is about. The holistic disposition grounding the law is part
and parcel of the primitive ontology, since it is not derived from anything
and belongs to that what the quantum formalism represents or refers to. It
is a beable existing in three-dimensional space, albeit not a local one. A fur-
ther major result of this paper hence is that in endorsing dispositionalism,
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one can include something in the ontology that accounts for the temporal
development of the local beables, without having to resort to accepting the
wave-function in configuration space as an element of physical reality. One
advantage of the particle ontology is that the disposition can be understood
as a holistic property of the local beables themselves, whereas in the GRW-
theory, spatial localization of the mass-density or flashes has to be regarded
as the manifestation of the disposition (see Dorato and Esfeld 2010 for dis-
positions in GRW). On the question of Humeanism versus dispositionalism
we side with dispositionalism, since we take it to be a sound demand to call
for something in the ontology that accounts for the temporal development
of the elements of physical reality and that grounds the law of motion, thus
providing for real connections in nature. Let us stress once again that the
dualism of properties to which we are thus committed is only an appearance,
a mere heuristic device to introduce dispositions. As explained above, there
are not different types of properties assigned to the elements of the primitive
ontology, spatial positions and velocities as categorical, local properties and
in addition to that a holistic, dispositional property for a certain temporal
development of these entities that fixes the velocities. There simply are be-
ables that in being localized have the common disposition to develop in a
certain manner in time. However, we are aware of the fact that clearing up
the relationship between position and the disposition for temporal develop-
ment (particles’ positions and their holistic disposition of motion in Bohmian
mechanics) is an open research project rather than a subject with established
results. But the mere possibility of opening up that research question may
be taken to be a further advantage of dispositionalism, showing that it is a
promising programme for further research in the foundations of physics.
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